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I.

Introduction

An enduring reality demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 is that non-state actors are capable of projecting extreme violence across
the globe. The September 11 attackers were a variety of individuals who were
trained and recruited across multiple states, who were instructed and funded by a
loose but sophisticated al Qaeda network, and who then surreptitiously acquired
the means to unleash a vicious attack that within a matter of hours killed more
than three thousand people, mostly civilians.1
This ability of non-state actors to project force across the globe is
particularly troubling in the context of their potential use of weapons of mass
destruction (“WMD”). Although governments have possessed WMD for many
decades, such weapons have rarely been used, largely because of the
understanding by states that the use of WMD against another state would almost
certainly lead to general, worldwide condemnation and possibly a response in
kind. Such notions of inter-state deterrence and reciprocity, however, are far less
apparent with respect to relations between a state and a non-state actor engaged
in terrorist behavior, especially if the non-state actor is not seeking broad
sympathy for its cause.
A terrorist organization may well believe that
responsibility for a WMD attack could be concealed from the attacked state, or
believe that the attacked state could not effectively respond against an
amorphous non-state network. Thus, were such a network able to obtain WMD-whether in the form of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons--there may be
little incentive not to use them.
___________________________________
* My thanks to the Fletcher School of Tufts University for the opportunity to
present an earlier version of this paper, and to José Arvelo-Vélez for both
thoughtful insights and invaluable research assistance.
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Acquisition of WMD by non-state actors may be difficult, but is not
impossible. Large stocks of Russian plutonium from dismantled weapons are
vulnerable to theft and sale on the black market.2 Infectious organisms suitable
for bioterrorist use are available for commercial sale; some twenty-five such
organisms can even be obtained from natural sources, such as infected animals
or, in the case of anthrax, the soil.3 The possibility of an attack by terrorists using
chemical weapons was vividly demonstrated in March 1995 in Tokyo, Japan,
when a religious cult released a form of sarin nerve gas in Tokyo’s subway
system during morning rush hour, killing twelve and injuring more than five
thousand people.4 Once WMD are acquired, transporting them across the globe
is also difficult, but not impossible. The United States has 14,000 small airports
and 95,000 miles of unprotected coastline; of the some 16 million cargo
containers that reach U.S. shores each year, only five percent are inspected.5
The idea that an organization such as al Qaeda may obtain a WMD, smuggle it
into the United States on board a container ship and then release or detonate it
in a major U.S. city, strikes many analysts as not so much a question of “if” as it
is a question of “when.”6
The realities of the post-September 11 period led the Bush Administration
in 2002 to articulate, in very strong and public terms, a doctrine of “preemptive
self-defense.” Among other things, the doctrine asserted an evolved right under
international law for the United States to use military force “preemptively” against
the threat posed by “rogue states” or terrorists who possess WMD.7 According to
the Bush Administration:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists
do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know
such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and,
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction--weapons that
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without
warning.
....
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
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greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of
the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.8
Although the Bush Administration articulated the doctrine, acceptance of
the doctrine within the U.S. government appears widespread. In the joint
resolution enacted by Congress to authorize the use of force against Iraq in
2002-2003, Congress found:
Iraq’s demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of
mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either
employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the
United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international
terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that
would result to the United States and its citizens from such an
attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend
itself.”9
Asked about this issue during the 2004 presidential campaign, the nominee for
the Democratic Party endorsed the doctrine.10
Compliance with international law on the use of armed force presents
extraordinary problems, for such law implicates core national security interests of
states (the same phenomenon may be seen in disputes over the war power in
U.S. constitutional law). Nevertheless, policy-makers must pay attention to
whether a particular act of “preemptive self-defense” would likely be regarded as
violating international law, because there may be significant political, economic,
and military repercussions, as discussed in Part II.11 To date, however, no
authoritative decision-maker within the international community has taken a
position on whether preemptive self-defense is permissible under international
law, or whether it is permissible but only under certain conditions. The judicial
wing of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), has not
passed upon a case or issued an advisory opinion on preemptive self-defense.
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua12 case
(“Nicaragua case”), the ICJ advanced important interpretations regarding the
status of law on the use of force, but the ICJ went out of its way to state
expressly that it took no view on “the lawfulness of a response to the imminent
threat of an armed attack.”13
The U.N. Security Council, charged with
maintaining peace and security, has issued no resolution expressly condemning
or approving of preemptive self-defense, although it has issued important
decisions that relate to the issue.
Consequently, states and scholars are left arguing its legality based
principally on their interpretation of the meaning of the U.N. Charter and on state
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practice since the Charter’s enactment in 1945. As discussed in Part III,
international lawyers (whether government attorneys, other practitioners or
academics) have taken very different views regarding the legality of preemptive
self-defense, and their views might be seen as falling into four basic schools of
thought: the strict constructionist school, the imminent threat school, the
qualitative threat school and the “charter is dead” school.14 Part IV suggests that
this fracturing of views is attributable at least in part to the unwillingness of most
international lawyers to articulate and defend the methodology that they are
using in reaching their views, which would require confronting certain
methodological problems in assessing state practice since the enactment of the
U.N. Charter in 1945.15 The lawyer’s craft is something between an art and a
science; although interpretation of prior precedent cannot be done with precision,
it must be done in accordance with recognizable and rational standards in order
to be persuasive.
Until lawyers more fully grapple with these issues of methodology, it is
unlikely that greater convergence within the community of international lawyers
will emerge. Through greater convergence, the normative standards set by
international law may become clearer and more helpful for states in ordering their
relations, thus promoting greater stability for inter-state relations. Moreover, if at
some point there is an effort to amend the Charter or to supplement the Charter
with more detailed criteria for uses of force, greater convergence of views among
international lawyers will be essential.
Before turning to the relevance of international law to this particular topic,
a word on terminology is in order. For purposes of this article, the term “selfdefense” refers to the use of armed coercion by a state against another state in
response to a prior use of armed coercion by the other state or by a non-state
actor operating from that other state. “Anticipatory self-defense” refers to the use
of armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent act of armed coercion by
another state (or non-state actor operating from that other state). Thus,
anticipatory self-defense contemplates a situation where a state has not yet been
the victim of such a coercive act, but perceives that such an act is about to occur
in the immediate future (e.g., a foreign army is massing itself along the border in
apparent preparation for invasion), and thus that potential victim state undertakes
its own act of armed coercion to stave off the other’s act. Such anticipatory selfdefense is, of course, “preemptive” in nature, but for purposes of this article, the
term “preemptive” is not used to describe this form of self-defense. Instead,
“preemptive self defense” is used to refer to the use of armed coercion by a state
to prevent another state (or non-state actor) from pursuing a particular course of
action which is not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue,
could result at some future point in an act of armed coercion against the first
state. Such preemptive self-defense is, of course, “anticipatory” and might even
be called “preventive” self-defense, but for purposes of this article, such
terminology is not used to describe this form of self-defense.
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II.

Why the Law Matters

Law has many different functions. In the context of international law
relating to the use of military force, law is best seen as a means of predicting
global reactions to a proposed use of such force. In this context, when a lawyer
says that a proposed course of action would be unlawful, the lawyer is really
saying that in the past international society has decided that such an action is
wrongful and, in similar circumstances, will likely do so again. Lawyers are
trained to be good at making such predictions; they are fixated on the
instruments of the past, be they treaties or statutes, which crystallize societal
expectations, principles and beliefs into rules. Lawyers are also fixated on
understanding and interpreting prior factual incidents in which those societal
beliefs were tested and perhaps refined through courts and other decisionmakers. Where there are gaps in our understanding of societal expectations,
lawyers are clever at analytically filling those gaps and at seeking to extrapolate
from what we know about societal beliefs to make situations of uncertainty more
certain. And perhaps most important, lawyers appreciate that society deeply
adheres to a normative system that will endure, and this in turn means that rules
must operate over the long-term. They cannot be set aside when convenient to
serve short-term interests, and they must be perceived as fair, legitimate, just
and consistent with notions of equality, rather than arbitrary or irrational.
A government policy-maker considering an act of preemptive self-defense
will want to know if the act would be regarded as lawful because it helps predict
attitudes within the policy-maker’s own government, whether those attitudes
emerge in executive, legislative or judicial settings. To the extent that the act is
regarded as a violation of international law, the policy-maker is being alerted that
the act would likely be viewed as wrongful. Knowing whether the act would be
regarded as lawful will assist the policy-maker in predicting whether the general
public would view the course of action as wrongful and whether foreign
governments and their peoples, and possibly an international court, would react
adversely to the course of action.16 Even in the United States, a country where
public attitudes toward international law vary considerably, government officials
and legislators seek to convince the public why a particular course of action is
consistent with international law.17
Societal attitudes are important because if resistance is strong, the policymaker may not be able to undertake a particular course of action (e.g., in the
United States or the United Kingdom, an adverse legislative vote may make an
executive resort to military force untenable). Of course, even in the face of
strong resistance, the policy-maker might undertake the act if, for political or
national security reasons, the policy-maker feels there is no choice. But the
policy-maker may be interested in knowing whether, by conducting the action in a
particular way, the policy-maker is more or less likely to run afoul of the law, for
such knowledge may help the policy maker achieve the objectives with the
lowest level of societal approbation. That approbation may have serious
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consequences for the policy-maker, particularly over the long-term, in the form of
eroding political support domestically and abroad for a government’s policies,
inability to secure military assistance from foreign partners in the form of troops,
bases, transport and materials, and the inability to share with those partners or
international organizations the economic costs of both the military action and any
ensuing acts of peacekeeping or reconstruction.
To date, however, lawyers have had difficulty in reaching a consensus on
whether preemptive self-defense is lawful and, if so, whether certain criteria or
conditions must be met. Because no authoritative decision-maker has spoken
directly to the issue, international lawyers are left arguing the legality of
preemptive self-defense based principally on their interpretation of the meaning
of the U.N. Charter as enacted in 1945 and on state practice since that time. In
doing so, lawyers have taken very different views regarding the legality of
preemptive self-defense and, as discussed in the next section, those views might
be seen as falling into four basic schools of thought.18
III.

Four Schools of Thought

Contemporary attitudes of government lawyers or academics on the issue
of preemptive self-defense tend to fall into four different schools of thought.
Describing these views as “schools” may be overly formal; such lawyers probably
do not see themselves as part of a “school” in the sense of having an elaborate
framework upon which their views are constructed. Moreover, international
lawyers within a single school may differ in certain respects, and the views of
some international lawyers may be seen as straddling these schools of thought
or as moving from one school to another over time.19 Nevertheless, the different
schools identified here rest upon broad conceptions as to the status of
international law on this topic, and probing at those different conceptions may
help in promoting convergence among them.
A.

The Strict-Constructionist School

The strict constructionist school begins with the proposition that Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter contains a broad prohibition on the use of force.20 The
term “use of force” in Article 2(4)--as opposed to the term “war,” as used in the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 192821--reflected a desire to prohibit transnational armed
conflicts generally, not just conflicts arising from a formal state of war. As such,
this school emphasizes that Article 2(4) is best viewed as outlawing any
transboundary use of military force, including force justified by reference to the
various doctrines developed in the pre-Charter era of forcible self-help, reprisal,
protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention.22 To the extent that there
is a need to refer to the negotiating history of the U.N. Charter, that history
indicates that Article 2(4) was intended to be a comprehensive prohibition on the
use of force by one state against the other.23
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The strict constructionist school acknowledges that the U.N. Charter
provides two express exceptions to this broad prohibition. First, the Security
Council may authorize a use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter,24 which
would require an affirmative vote of nine of its fifteen Members and the
concurrence or abstention of its five permanent Members (China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom and United States). Some strict constructionists might
challenge the authority of the Security Council to authorize Member States,
especially if operating under national military command, to engage in preemptive
self-defense, but the debate over preemptive self-defense to date has not related
to potential Security Council authorization.
Second, states may use force in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the
Charter. Article 51 states that the Charter does not impair the “inherent right” of
self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” against a U.N. Member.25 In considering
the legality of preemptive self-defense, the strict constructionist school hews
closely to the language of Article 51. Because Article 51 only contemplates an
act of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs,” the strict constructionist maintains
that neither anticipatory self-defense nor preemptive self-defense can be lawful
because such forms of self-defense envisage action prior to an armed attack
actually occurring.26 Thus, Ian Brownlie, writing in 1963, found that “the view that
Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct and . . . arguments to the
contrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”27
For Philip Jessup, “[u]nder the Charter, alarming military preparations by a
neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not
justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened.”28
For Louis Henkin, allowing anticipatory action “would replace a clear standard
with a vague, self-serving one, and open a loophole large enough to empty the
rule.”29 Likewise, Yoram Dinstein, writing more recently, finds that
[w]hen a country feels menaced by the threat of an armed attack,
all that it is free to do--in keeping with the Charter--is make the
necessary military preparations for repulsing the hostile action
should it materialize, as well as bring the matter forthwith to the
attention of the Security Council.30
Moreover, the strict constructionist would note that in using the language
“armed attack” rather than “use of force,” Article 51 is limiting the use of selfdefense to those situations where the victim state is exposed to a large-scale use
of force, such as an invasion or a bombardment or other “most grave forms of the
use of force.”31 This form of limitation does not speak directly to the issue of
preemptive self-defense, but the uncertainty as to whether a future threat would
actually rise to a level of being an “armed attack” may also suggest that
preemptive self-defense was disfavored under Article 51.32
Adherents to this school typically accept that state practice subsequent to
the enactment of the U.N. Charter is relevant,33 although they (and many
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international lawyers) are often not clear whether such practice is relevant for the
purpose of: (1) interpreting the meaning of the Charter, since conduct by the
parties to the Charter demonstrate the parties interpretation of its meaning; or (2)
establishing a new norm of customary international law that supersedes the
obligation of the Charter. In any event, the strict constructionist’s review of that
practice finds that invocations of a right of anticipatory self-defense (let alone a
right of preemptive self-defense) are rare and are resisted by other states. Thus,
Louis Henkin, writing in 1979, asserted that “neither the failure of the Security
Council, nor the Cold War, nor the birth of many new nations, nor the
development of terrible weapons, suggests that the Charter should now be read
to authorize unilateral force even if an armed attack has not occurred.”34
Christine Gray, writing in 2000, concluded that
States prefer to argue for an extended interpretation of armed
attack and to avoid the fundamental doctrinal debate. The clear
trend in state practice is to try to bring the action within Article 51
and to claim the existence of an armed attack rather than to
expressly argue for a wider right under customary international
law.35
When pressed, some strict constructionists accept that anticipatory or preemptive
action, while illegal, in some circumstances “may be justified on moral and
political grounds and the community will eventually condone [it] or mete out
lenient condemnation.”36
B.

The Imminent Threat School

Adherents to the “imminent threat” school accept that the language of
Article 51 speaks of self-defense in response to an armed attack, but they
employ three lines of argument to advance a norm favoring a right of anticipatory
self-defense, but not preemptive self-defense.37
First, they note that Article 51 speaks of the Charter not impairing an
“inherent right” of self-defense, meaning that Article 51 does not create a right of
self-defense but instead preserves a right that pre-existed the Charter.38 As
such, adherents to this school note that the customary international law of selfdefense prior to 1945 recognized the ability of a state to defend against not just
an existing attack, but also against an imminent threat of attack.39 The principal
precedent relied upon is the Caroline incident, an 1836 clash between the United
States and the United Kingdom in which U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
stated that self-defense is confined to “cases in which the ‘necessity of that selfdefence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation.”40
For adherents to the imminent threat school, this inherent right to defend
against an imminent threat was preserved in Article 51.41 The language “if an
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armed attack occurs” does not impose a condition on the exercise of this inherent
right; it is simply indicating the general type of right that is being preserved.42
Indeed, this school notes, the French text of the U.N. Charter (which is equally
authoritative with the English text), preserved an inherent right of self-defense
“dans un cas où un Membre des Nations Unies est l’object d’une agression
armée” (“in a situation where a Member of the United Nations is the object of an
armed attack”), a formulation that reads much less restrictively than its English
counterpart.43 Although the strict constructionist sees such an interpretation as
writing the “armed attack” language out of Article 51, the imminent threat theorist
finds absurdity in believing that the drafters bent over backwards in Article 51 so
as not to impair an “inherent right” only to then significantly restrict that right.44
A second line of argument employed by this school is to expand the
meaning of the term “armed attack.” Although a narrow interpretation of armed
attack might envisage only a use of force that has been consummated, a broader
interpretation would view an “armed attack” as including an attack that is
imminent and unavoidable even if not yet consummated. Thus, when a state
begins massing an army in an attack configuration along the border of another
state, the first state has commenced the initial step of a multi-step armed attack,
and the second state may respond in self-defense. Here, too, the argument is
concerned with the temporal nature of the threat; it must be closely associated in
time and space with the expected unleashing of force. Although Louis Henkin is
typically associated with the strict constructionist school, he accepts that if:
there were clear evidence of an attack so imminent that there was
no time for political action to prevent it, the only meaningful defense
for the potential victim might indeed be the preemptive attack and-it may be argued--the scheme of Article 2(4) together with Article 51
was not intended to bar such attack. But this argument would claim
a small and special exception for the special case of the surprise
nuclear attack . . . .45
Third, this school focuses on state practice since 1945, which purportedly
demonstrates an acceptance of self-defense by states when an attack is
imminent and unavoidable. In this regard, repeated references are made to
certain key incidents, such as: the 1962 “quarantine” of Cuba by the United
States; the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the 1981 Israeli attack against an Iraqi nuclear
facility; and the 1986 U.S. bombing raids against Libya.46 For each incident,
according to this school, a state may be seen undertaking an action purportedly
in self-defense that precedes an armed attack.47 Adherents to the imminent
threat school conclude that, by parsing this practice, states may be seen either
accepting or tolerating the use of military force by a state against another state
when faced with an imminent armed attack.48 Thus, Thomas Franck writes:
States seem willing to accept strong evidence of the imminence of
an overpowering attack as tantamount to the attack itself, allowing
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a demonstrably threatened state to respond under Article 51 as if
the attack had already occurred, or at least to treat such
circumstances, when demonstrated, as mitigating the system’s
judgment of the threatened state’s pre-emptive response.49
At the same time, adherents to this school are unwilling to expand the meaning
of Article 51 beyond the concept of responding to an imminent armed attack.50
For them, accepting the legality of preemptive self-defense would place the law
on a very slippery slope, taking us back into the pre-Charter world in which
nations resorted to warfare for “just” causes.51 Without the immediacy of an
attack, states must try to predict a future threat based on intelligence that will
always be tentative and often inaccurate.52 Further, in rejecting the concept of
preemptive self-defense, the imminent threat school relies in part on the
customary international law doctrine that force must only be used in accordance
with principles of necessity and proportionality.53 In considering whether force is
“necessary,” international lawyers ask certain core questions, such as whether
the act undertaken seeks solely to halt or repel the armed attack,54 and whether
there were peaceful alternatives available, such as pursuing diplomatic efforts.55
In considering whether an act of self-defense is proportional, international
lawyers consider the scale of the defensive force in relation to the act against
which it is directed.56 Under either principle, the imminent threat school stresses
that a movement from anticipatory self-defense to preemptive self-defense
presents troubling and insurmountable conflicts.57 It is simply not possible to
gauge with any degree of confidence whether an act of preemptive self-defense
today is necessary to deal with a threat that may not materialize for months or
years. Similarly, one cannot gauge whether the act of preemptive self-defense
today is proportionate to an inchoate future threat.58 As such, preemptive selfdefense cannot be regarded as lawful.
C.

The Qualitative Threat School

Adherents to the qualitative threat school agree with the imminent threat
school that a state need not await an actual armed attack, but believe that the
latter school’s requirement of an imminent threat is misplaced. For the qualitative
threat school, the world has changed significantly since 1945, particularly with
the advent of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of global terrorism.
Adhering to the strictures of the Caroline standard in a contemporary world is a
recipe for paralysis in the face of grave threats.59 For this school, President John
Kennedy had it right when he identified the nuclear age as one in which the
actual firing of a weapon can no longer be the touchstone for determining
whether a nation is in peril.60 Rather than emphasize just the temporal nature of
a future attack, this school looks to other qualitative factors,61 such as the
probability that an attack will occur at some future point, the availably of nonforcible means for addressing the situation, and the magnitude of harm that the
attack would inflict.62 Where those qualitative factors indicate that there is a high
probability of a future, highly destructive attack, a state may act as necessary
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and proportionate in preemptive self-defense.
According to this school,
accepting this approach to self-defense would result in a greater, not lesser
likelihood of maintaining world public order because it would serve to deter state
and non-state actors from embarking on programs likely to lead to armed
conflict.63
For this school, state practice since 1945--such as the U.S. “quarantine” of
Cuba, the 1989 U.S invasion of Panama,64 and the U.S. attacks against Libya in
1986, Iraq in 1993,65 and Sudan and Afghanistan in 199866--supports the
acceptance of preemptive self-defense because there was no imminent attack
against which the state in those incidents was defending. Although many states
opposed such uses of force (and most incidents involved deployment of force by
just a single actor, the United States), this school nevertheless sees those
incidents as evincing a degree of global tolerance of preemptive self-defense in
appropriate circumstances.
The qualitative threat school sees its views as simply extending the
position expressed by the imminent threat school, so as to take account of the
full spectrum of potential armed attacks. If one were to try to represent
graphically the views of the qualitative threat school, one might develop a threedimensional graph reflecting on three axes three principal factors of relevance in
determining the legality of an act of preemptive self-defense: (1) the imminence
of an attack (the higher it is, preemptive force is more acceptable); (2) the level of
coercive force used in response (the lower it is, preemptive force is more
acceptable); and (3) the threat to the existence of the responding state (the
higher it is, preemptive force is more acceptable).
D.

The “Charter-is-Dead” School

Finally, there is a school of thought that sees the rules on the use of force
embedded in the Charter as completely devoid of any legally significant
normative value. In 1945 these rules might have had some cachet, but the
practice of states over the course of the past sixty years can only lead to a
conclusion that states do not adhere to the U.N. Charter in any legally meaningful
way and, therefore, the rules have fallen into desuetude. States may say that the
rules exist and that they are adhering to them,67 but this is simply empty rhetoric,
a public relations ploy designed to mask the reality of states simply pursuing their
political interests. Michael Glennon writes:
The Charter’s use of force rules have been widely and regularly
disregarded. Since 1945, two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations--126 states out of 189--have fought 291 interstate conflicts
in which over 22 million people have been killed. In every one of
those conflicts at least one belligerent necessarily violated the
Charter. In most of those conflicts, most of the belligerents claim to
act in self-defense. States’ earlier intent, expressed in words, has
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been superseded by their later intent, expressed in deeds.68
As a consequence, the “Charter-is-dead” school sees no legal impediment
to engaging in self-defense, anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense,
whenever a state perceives a need to protect the well-being of its people. Our
global civilization may evolve such that states, powerful and less powerful alike,
can reach consensus on international rules concerning the use of force (perhaps
through effective enforcement mechanisms), but until then there is no point in
trying to split legal hairs about the meaning of Article 51.
IV.

Can the Schools Be Reconciled? Confronting Methodological
Problems in Assessing State Practice

The strikingly divergent views on the legality of preemptive self-defense no
doubt have several causal explanations. International law as a whole suffers
from the lack of authoritative decision-makers, such as a supreme court with
plenary power to decide controversial questions of either legal process or
substance, thus making harder a convergence of views. Further, international
law on the use of force presents particular difficulties in promoting state fidelity to
a normative structure given that adherence to norms is under the greatest stress
when issues of national security are at stake. Finally, the norms may not be
static in nature. Whether September 11 can be viewed as a “constitutional
moment” for international law--meaning a moment in which seismic shifts in
international law occurred without any formal amendment--is unclear, but the rise
of global terrorism represented by those attacks challenges many of the
conventional assumptions upon which international law has been based.
Despite these many factors, a central reason for these divergences of
view may well be that international lawyers are not explaining the methodology
that they are employing in determining the state of the law, are not recognizing
that their disagreement with other international lawyers arises largely from the
use of different methodologies and are not articulating why one methodology is
superior to another. In particular, to the extent that state practice is deemed
significant for purposes of interpreting the U.N. Charter or determining the
emergence of a new customary rule of law, international lawyers rarely explain
their view as to the circumstances that merit using state practice to establish an
evolution in the state of the law and too often provide only a cursory analysis of
such practice to see if those circumstances are met. Unfortunately, in reading
the literature one cannot help but feel that international lawyers are often coming
to this issue with firm predispositions as to whether anticipatory self-defense or
preemptive self-defense should or should not be legal and then molding their
interpretation of state practice to fit the predispositions.
Ideally, international lawyers would agree upon a narrative explanatory
protocol that would set forth a coherent structure for analyzing and configuring
state practice, as has been done in the field of international relations theory.69
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Among other things, developing such a protocol may allow international lawyers
to move away from a binary discussion of whether preemptive self-defense is
lawful or unlawful, to one that explores the subtleties and nuances of how states
react to varying levels of such force being used in different kinds of factual
scenarios. The purpose of this section is to identify some of the key issues that
arise in assessing methodology and state practice on this topic in the hope that it
may promote the pursuit of an explanatory protocol and in turn more rigorous
analyses by international lawyers and more convergence in the positions taken
by them regarding the legality of preemptive self-defense.70 Through greater
convergence in the views taken by international lawyers, the normative standards
set by international law may become clearer and more helpful for states in
ordering their relations.
A.

The Problem of Clarifying Methodology

Most international lawyers are taught that when faced with a question of
whether a particular treaty has been violated (such as the U.N. Charter), one is to
focus on the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the treaty, in their context and in
light of the treaty’s “object and purpose.”71 Moreover, one may also take into
account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”72 Virtually
all international lawyers writing on the doctrine of preemptive self-defense either
consciously or unconsciously use some elements of this approach to treaty
interpretation, but they often adopt a particular component of the methodology
that is useful for advancing their position on preemptive self-defense and avoid
emphasizing (or even recognizing) other components. An emphasis on the text
of the treaty is sometimes referred to as a “textual” or “literal” approach, and an
emphasis on the object and purpose of the treaty is an “effective” or “teleological”
approach.73
Thus, the “strict constructionist” school heavily relies on the ordinary
meaning of the terms of Article 51, which, as discussed above, appears to
require an “armed attack” prior to engaging in a right of self-defense.74 For the
strict constructionist, the language of Article 51 presents a high hurdle over which
the other schools cannot leap. Yet, this school tends to downplay or ignore the
other elements relevant to treaty analysis, particularly the possibility that over
time states may reinterpret Article 51 through their practice. Since 1945, states
have deviated from the language of the Charter in many ways that are found
acceptable by states, ranging from the practice of permanent Members
abstaining (rather than concurring) on substantive issues decided by the Security
Council75 to the reading of UN Charter Article 23’s reference to “the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics” as meaning now the “Russian Federation”76 to the
use of conflict resolution techniques nowhere contemplated in the Charter, such
as U.N.-authorized “peacekeeping” forces, the General Assembly’s use of the
“Uniting for Peace” resolution77 or U.N. authorizations to military forces operating
under national commands.
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The strict constructionist normally reviews some of the state practice since
1945, but finds such practice too sparse or unconvincing to establish a
reinterpretation of Article 51.78 The strict constructionist, however, would be
more convincing by explaining clearly his methodology for examining state
practice (such as by confronting several of the problems identified below) and
indicating why a norm favoring, for example, the bestowal of Security Council
authority on states operating under national commands is deemed lawful under
that methodology, whereas preemptive self-defense is not. Moreover, the strict
constructionist often stresses evidence within the negotiating history of the
Charter that favors a restrictive reading of Article 51, even though standard treaty
interpretation disfavors reference to such history absent ambiguity in the text or
absurdity in application of the text.79 The strict constructionist should confront the
fact that subsequent state practice holds a higher place under standard treaty
interpretation than negotiating history and should candidly assess whether the
ordinary meaning of Article 51 is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative
interpretations.
The “imminent threat” school also dwells somewhat on the ordinary
meaning of Article 51, but stresses the term “inherent right” of self-defense and
uses such language to bootstrap in the pre-Charter standard of self-defense
reflected in the Caroline incident in support of its position.80 Yet, the “imminent
threat” school senses the weakness in focusing on the language of Article 51 and
thus moves quickly in its methodology to post-1945 state practice, typically
providing a more detailed account of that practice than the strict constructionist.81
Here too, however, “imminent threat” theorists usually do not examine their
methodology for assessing state practice; it remains unclear exactly what
elements of state practice are relevant and why. Like strict constructionists,
imminent threat theorists would be more convincing if they set forth a cogent
methodology, explained how that methodology fit with respect to issues other
than anticipatory self-defense and then used the methodology to demonstrate
why anticipatory self-defense is permissible.
The “qualitative threat” school downplays the ordinary meaning of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter--even denigrates reliance on such language as a “push
button” approach to legal analysis82—-and further downplays post-1945 state
practice, no doubt realizing that neither is particularly useful in establishing a right
of preemptive self-defense. Instead, the qualitative threat school at its heart
argues that preemptive self-defense is lawful because the “object and purpose”
of Article 51 is to maintain each state’s inherent right of self-defense.83 They
believe that in a world with WMD and terrorists acting secretly and with state
support the only reasonable way of achieving this purpose is to permit
preemptive self-defense.84
A central problem with this approach is that reasonable minds disagree on
the object and purpose of Article 51. For the strict constructionist school, the
object and purpose of Article 51 is to “cut to a minimum the unilateral use of force
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in international relations,”85 which is best served by precluding both anticipatory
self-defense and preemptive self-defense. At the end of the day, the qualitative
threat school must confront why its “reasonable” interpretation of the Charter’s
object and purpose is superior to that of others. The most plausible means for
doing so would be to establish that the “qualitative threat” interpretation has been
widely adopted by states, which in turn should lead this school into identifying
and demonstrating a methodology of assessing state practice.
The “Charter-is-dead” school is deeply interested in post-1945 state
practice, to the point of finding that such practice has completely upended
whatever normative rules emerged in 1945. As noted above, for this school
there is such widespread evidence in state practice of a departure from Charter
norms that the norms have no meaning.86 Therefore, preemptive self-defense is
lawful (or at least cannot be considered unlawful). But this school typically does
not advance a methodology of legal interpretation that can be seen as holding
true with respect to international law and that therefore is appropriate to apply to
preemptive self-defense. For instance, this school’s reference to “291 interstate
conflicts” since 1945 might prove that Charter rules on the use of force have no
normative value, but on the same logic, perhaps the lack of, say, 582 interstate
conflicts proves that such rules have normative value.87 In other words, laws are
broken all the time; in the United States in 2002 there were 16,204 murders and
2,151,875 burglaries.88 But the fact of law violation--even widespread law
violation--is not commonly viewed as proving that the law does not exist or that it
does not have an effect in conditioning the behavior of those to whom it is
addressed.89 For example, if the speed limit on a road is 55 miles per hour, but it
is widely accepted that one may travel at 60 miles per hour without
repercussions, then the speed limit has established a normative standard (55
plus 5) that individuals accept as appropriate for judging deviant behavior.
To seriously consider the relevance of interstate conflict since 1945, it
would help to know whether there were instances where interstate conflict did not
occur because an aggressor state found unacceptable the consequences of
violating the non-aggression norm. It would help to know whether the existence
of global norms on the use of force have, in some sense, seeped into the
“collective consciousness” of global society. If so, then perhaps leaders today (as
opposed to their predecessors of a century ago) are more apt to abide by the
norm than they would in its absence, peoples are more apt to resist leaders who
depart from the norm, and states are more apt to condemn other states that
depart from the norm even though such departures inevitably occur. One might
want to know in how many interstate conflicts since 1945 the norm provided a
basis for galvanizing global reaction to the resort to force, whether in the
dramatic form of the U.N.-authorized coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in
1991 or the insistent pressure brought to bear on Eritrea and Ethiopia during
1998-2000. Even with respect to resort to force by powerful states, one might
posit that raw power may be occasionally used, but that because deviation from
the norm promotes instability and escalation, such states more often apply their
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power within the framework of the normative system.90 The “Charter-is-dead”
school is correct that we cannot simply assume these things;91 they must, if
possible, be demonstrated.92 At the same time, it is not convincing simply to
assume that state conduct is not affected by norms on the use of force,
especially because states repeatedly and consistently assert that the norms of
the Charter are relevant and applicable and because there are instances where
adherence to the norms seem quite important to states.93 Close analysis of state
practice would appear to be the best way for the “Charter-is-dead” school to
prove that the rules of the Charter are indeed dead.
It would also be useful to clarify whether state practice since 1945 is
relevant for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of the Charter or,
alternatively, for the purpose of determining whether a new norm of customary
international law has emerged that supersedes the obligations set forth in the
Charter, and if so whether it makes any difference. To the extent that there is
discussion of this issue, the strict constructionist school may resort to the notion
of jus cogens94 as a means of arguing that a new rule of customary international
law cannot emerge because states may not deviate from the strict
constructionist’s interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51,95 but the other schools
may question whether the emergent custom really deviates from the U.N. Charter
or may challenge the very notion of jus cogens.96 In any event, most discussions
of preemptive self-defense tend to glide over this issue, even though it is central
to the question of why and how one is considering state practice.
The brief discussion above suggests that there is a common component
among the four schools of thought: the general lack of attention to the
methodological approach in assessing the legality of preemptive self-defense
and an unwillingness to explain why one approach is superior to another. At the
same time, each of the four schools appears interested, to a degree, in the role
of state practice since 1945, such that if better agreement existed among the
schools regarding how such practice should be treated, it might be possible to
see some convergence among them.97 Thus, if the “strict constructionist” and
the “imminent threat” theorist can agree that post-1945 state practice matters,
then focusing on and perhaps reaching agreement how such practice should be
assessed would be a helpful step prior to actually assessing the practice.
Likewise, the “qualitative threat” theorist may downplay state practice of the kind
typically raised in discussions of preemptive self-defense, but if the qualitative
threat theorist could convince the other schools that state practice should be
viewed as broader than just actual incidents of state conduct so as to encompass
evidence of broader expectations and beliefs of governments and peoples, then
the qualitative threat theorist might be positioned to demonstrate that state
practice supports preemptive self-defense. With these observations in mind, the
remaining portions of this section focus on some of the problems that must be
confronted in taking state practice in this area seriously.98
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B.

The Problem of Relying on What States Say Versus What They Do

In assessing whether states in the past have engaged in anticipatory or
preemptive self-defense, international lawyers are divided over whether, in
assessing an incident of state practice, one should focus on the legal justification
asserted by the state undertaking a use of force or, rather, look past that
justification to try to ascertain what decision-makers actually believed about what
was legally permissible.99 In other words, if a state undertakes an action in a
situation that on its face appears to be anticipatory or preemptive self-defense
(i.e., there is no factual basis for the existence of a prior armed attack), and the
state nevertheless claims that it is acting in self-defense against an armed attack,
international lawyers differ on whether this demonstrates adherence to the
traditional norm of self-defense against an armed attack (albeit mistaken selfdefense) or tacitly demonstrates adherence to a new norm of anticipatory or
preemptive self-defense.100 A more robust exchange among international
lawyers as to whether a state’s asserted legal justification is the exclusive
touchstone when assessing state practice may help in promoting better
convergences in their views.
For example, in her analysis of why state practice does not support a right
of anticipatory self-defense, Christine Gray principally focuses on what states say
they are doing, because the
reluctance expressly to invoke anticipatory self-defense is in itself a clear
indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use of force.
States take care to try to secure the widest possible support; they do not
invoke a doctrine that they know will be unacceptable to the vast majority
of states.101
Gray then reviews various incidents sometimes referred to as demonstrating
anticipatory self-defense, such as the 1967 Israeli strikes against Egypt, Jordan
and Syria and finds that because the attacking state (e.g., Israel) publicly stated
that it had been the victim of a prior armed attack, the incident cannot stand as
an example of anticipatory self-defense.102
This approach to assessing state practice may have the benefit of
simplicity; one simply looks for the publicly asserted legal justification by the
relevant state actor and decides whether that statement asserts the emergence
of a new norm. In particular, one might focus exclusively on the legal justification
presented by a state in its report to the Security Council, which is supposed to
occur as part of the state’s obligation under U.N. Charter Article 51.103 At the
same time, there may be differing legal justifications advanced by different
branches or agencies of a government, legal justifications may change over time,
and, even if a single justification is asserted, the justification may either be too
simple in nature (“we are acting consistent with the U.N. Charter”) or too diverse
in nature (“our actions are legally justified for a variety of reasons”), such that
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drawing a definitive conclusion becomes problematic.104 Yet, assuming that one
can divine a single stated legal justification, reliance solely on that justification
raises important questions. If it were the case that states were repeatedly and
consistently engaging in anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense and
yet simply stating that such action was in response to an armed attack, even
when it was not, is it really correct simply to rely on the asserted legal justification
when determining the operative rule? If the law on the books provides for a
speed limit of 55 miles per hour, but a driver says that “I am not speeding” when
the driver is going 60 miles per hour and there are no repercussions in doing so,
it would seem that the better advice when someone asks “how fast can I go?” is
that the normative system allows one to go 60 miles per hour. The reluctance of
states to assert a legal justification that adopts a new norm may reflect a state’s
belief that there is no such norm, but it may also reflect the reality that during the
time when states in transition from an old norm to a new, states wish to act in
accordance with the new norm without being labeled as acting unlawfully, and
thus seek to portray their acts as complying with the old norm.
The other schools appear much less focused on what a state says about
its actions and more focused on what a state does. For example, Thomas
Franck finds that the 1967 Israeli strikes were a precedent of anticipatory selfdefense because Israel’s argument that it was the victim of an armed attack “was
difficult to credit,” and that other “words and actions” demonstrated an Israeli
acceptance of the right of anticipatory self-defense.105 Similarly, in considering
the relevance of the U.S. “quarantine” of Cuba in 1962, some international
lawyers note that the United States based its official legal justification on a theory
of “regional enforcement action” under Chapter VIII of the Charter and thus find
that the quarantine is not a precedent for preemptive self-defense,106 but others
find such a justification not credible and therefore look past it to support a right of
anticipatory self-defense107 or preemptive self-defense.108 Indeed, the entire
“New Haven” school of international law as policy science was built upon peeling
away the formalistic rules advanced by states so as to ascertain the true rules
upon which states actually operate.109 Yet, as discussed in the next sub-section,
the difficulty with this approach is in figuring out exactly what states are doing.110
This problem of whether to focus on what states say as opposed to what
they do may account for why some international lawyers state unequivocally that
the U.S. government has consistently supported a prohibition on the preemptive
self-defense,111 but others have asserted that the U.S. government has claimed a
right of preemptive self-defense starting in the 1980s.112 Still others see the
United States as having engaged in preemptive self-defense from the earliest
days of its history.113 The recent invasion of Iraq highlights this problem. There
is a widespread perception that the invasion of Iraq was an implementation of the
doctrine articulated by the Bush Administration in 2002.114 Indeed, when
President Bush announced to the nation that military operations against Iraq had
begun in March 2003, he said:
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The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not
live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with
weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our
Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not
have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and
doctors on the streets of our cities.115
At the same time, when explaining the legal basis for its action against Iraq under
international law, the United States did not assert that the invasion of Iraq was
permissible under international law because of an evolved right of preemptive
self-defense.116 Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful
because it was authorized by the Security Council,117 a theory also maintained by
the other members of the U.S.-led coalition.118 At most, it seems that some of
the U.S. government’s statements on the legality of the action contained cryptic
references suggesting legal authority other than that emanating from Security
Council resolutions, but the terms “anticipatory self-defense” or “preemptive selfdefense” are never used.119 Consequently, it is no surprise that some
international lawyers believe that the invasion of Iraq provides no precedent for a
right of preemptive self-defense,120 but others assert that it does.121
C.

The Problem of Figuring Out What States Are Actually Doing

If international lawyers look past a state’s asserted legal justification to find
out what states are actually doing, they may avoid some of the concerns noted
above, but they then must confront additional concerns. Is the inquiry seeking to
determine objectively, without reference to a state’s decision-makers’ subjective
attitudes, whether the state’s conduct in using force demonstrates the
emergence of a new legal norm? Or is the inquiry seeking to determine the
attitudes of the state’s relevant decision-makers, which might encompass
attitudes as to why the state is using force or why its conduct is lawful?122 In
other words, in considering the action against Iraq in 2003, are we simply asking
whether the United States embarked on a use of force in a situation that looks
like preemptive self-defense? Or are we asking whether U.S. decision-makers
undertook such action with a belief that they were preempting a future threat or
that preemptive self-defense was lawful under the U.N. Charter, regardless of
whether the official U.S. legal justification advanced a different theory?123 If we
are interested in decision-makers’ attitudes, then we must further decide whether
to focus on the heads of state, ministers, legal advisers, legislators or the general
public. The imminent threat and qualitative threat schools might be more
convincing to the strict constructionist and Charter-is-dead schools if they
elaborated on exactly how such an inquiry should be conducted (e.g., by
explaining which tools, such as social science techniques, should be brought to
bear) and then conducted such an inquiry. Indeed, the Charter-is-dead school
doubts whether such an inquiry is even possible and suggests that if it were
conducted successfully, the answer might be that decision-makers are acting
without any thought as to “the law.”124

T-19

Leaving aside the issue of the relevant decision-makers’ attitudes, a
related concern is that it may prove extremely difficult to draw lines between
“traditional” self-defense and anticipatory or preemptive self-defense in assessing
what states are actually doing. International lawyers should clearly explain how
one determines that a state is acting in “anticipation” or in “preemption” of a
future action, rather than responding to a prior act. International lawyers would
do well to recognize that traditional acts of self-defense often are concerned with
the prevention of future coercion, while acts of preemptive self-defense invariably
are concerned in part with preexisting coercion. Finding an appropriate
delineation between the two is more difficult than international lawyers are
usually willing to admit.
Thus, a standard formulation of what constitutes a “defensive” response
refers to steps taken to repel an attacker, but state practice suggests that this is
far too restrictive in nature.125 It is commonly accepted that, when one state
invades another state, the invaded state may respond by not just repelling the
invader, but by entering the invader’s territory for reasons such as setting up a
buffer zone until an armistice is concluded.126 If the invader has been repulsed,
however, why is a buffer zone allowed? It is a defensive means of preventing
future attacks, even long after the guns have fallen silent. Further, even if a state
does not invade another state, it is commonly accepted that if a state bombs a
military base of another state, the second state may respond in proportionate
self-defense, not as a means of stopping the initial bombing (which has already
ended), but to deter and prevent such future attacks. Whether one classifies
such a response as “defensive armed reprisal,”127 “defensive retaliation”128 or an
act “undertaken in the framework of an ongoing armed conflict,”129 the point is
that the response is future-oriented, seeking to stop acts that are yet to occur.
Even the ICJ, which is very restrictive in its approach to use of force
issues, accepts that a series of military raids, in which territory is not occupied,
might constitute an armed attack that merits self-defense, yet, here too, such a
response is not repulsion of the prior raids, but anticipation and prevention of
future ones.130 The ICJ may even accept that it is possible to engage in selfdefense to prevent future mining attacks, after just a single ship has been mined,
so long as the complaining State can establish who mined the ship and the
complaining State’s response is necessary and proportionate to the mining.131
The problem of how one characterizes a “defensive” response is even
more apparent in the context of responding to terrorist attacks, which are
designed as sudden, single attacks without further sustained paramilitary
engagement. For example, consider the United States’ response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Most international lawyers believe that the
United States: (1) sustained an armed attack in September 2001 from a terrorist
group supported by Afghanistan’s de facto government and therefore (2) was
entitled, under Article 51, to respond in self-defense in November 2001,
deploying military forces to Afghanistan to eliminate al Qaeda bases and topple
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the Taliban government that tolerated them.132 This factual sequence of selfdefense is relatively straightforward and was accepted by Security Council,
NATO and the Organization of American States.133 Some international lawyers,
however, have asserted that the United States’ use of force constituted
preemptive self-defense because the “armed attack against the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon was over, and no defensive action could have
ameliorated its effects.”134
This disagreement raises the question of what factual continuum should
be used in considering whether an action is being taken “in anticipation” or
“preemptively,” which then raises the question of what a state may do when it
engages in self-defense. Most international lawyers would not conclude, for
example, that on December 8, 1941, the United States had no basis for acting in
self-defense against Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, simply because the attack
was over and no defensive action could ameliorate its effects. Nor did the United
States lose its right to engage in self-defense, even though it took many weeks
for a buildup of ground and air forces in the Pacific before the United States
could meaningfully respond to Japan’s attack and months before General
Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo.135 Rather, in these situations, there is a sense that-given the fact of a prior attack--the attacked state must be able to engage in any
action that is necessary to preclude any such attacks in the future, to wit
defeating Japan militarily. Whether one is considering the World Trade Center or
Pearl Harbor, there is an idea, embedded within standard notions of self-defense,
that a state, having been attacked, may ward off future similar attacks through
defensive action. Granted, the likelihood of future attacks is much more apparent
when an attack already has occurred, but nevertheless the defensive response
focuses on preventing future attacks, not simply repulsing the prior attack.
Conversely, acts of preemptive self-defense, likely by definition, entail some
preceding action by the state or group against whom the action is taken.
If this is true, then the salient question asks at what point this traditional
right of self-defense transitions into one of anticipatory self-defense or
preemptive self-defense. In 1986, a bomb exploded in a German discotheque
frequented by U.S. servicemen.136 Thereafter, the United States bombed
Libya.137 Assuming that the initial bombing is regarded as an “armed attack”
(which raises a different issue), is the U.S. action best regarded as traditional
self-defense against a pre-existing attack, as some international lawyers claim, or
is it preemptive self-defense against unknown attacks that may occur at some
unspecified point in the future, as other international lawyers claim?138 If one
takes at face value NATO’s claim that it was at least partially acting in selfdefense when it bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia &
Montenegro in 1999,139 is such action “anticipatory” given that the FRY had not
yet unleashed its forces in Kosovo140 or not because of the FRY’s prior
aggression in the Balkans in the course of the 1990s? Assuming that the U.S.led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is best seen as a form of self-defense under Article
51, is it preemptive or is it responsive to prior Iraqi armed attacks on its neighbors
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during the 1980s and 1990s, along with the threat created by its use of, and
efforts to acquire, WMD? Until we achieve greater clarity in classifying such
conduct, convergence of views about states’ conduct in this area will be difficult.
D.

The Problem of Accounting for Global Reactions

Assuming that international lawyers can sort out how best to analyze the
conduct of a state that resorts to a use of force, a further problem arises in
gauging the reaction of other states to that state’s conduct. In situations where
arguably the state resorts to anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense,
the strict constructionist school dismisses that action as law-breaking, rather than
law-making, by reference to whether other states have accepted the conduct as
lawful or not.141 This approach appears to be methodologically acceptable,
whether one is considering state practice for purposes of interpreting the U.N.
Charter or for determining the existence of a new customary rule of international
law, but the same types of problems identified above, with respect to analyzing a
state’s conduct in using force, is now amplified by having to determine all other
states’ counter-practices in response to that force. Are we concerned only with
the official positions of other states or do we wish to look behind them? Are we
looking for legal interpretations or are the reactions of foreign states that might be
construed as simply political statements relevant as well? When a foreign state
condemns a use of force, it may express that condemnation in legal terms or it
may not (one can condemn a lawful act for political, moral or other reasons).
Moreover, should one construe a state’s silence in the face of a use of force as
tacit acceptance, indifference or meaningless? Should we give equal weight to
all states’ views, so that tiny Andorra’s voice is equal to China’s and authoritarian
governments’ perspectives are just as valuable as those of democratic
governments? The reality is that no international lawyer conducts a systematic
review of the reactions of all 190 states to just one state’s use of force, nor
explains how, if such a review were done, we should deal with silence and
conflicting views among states. Instead, international lawyers often look at the
practice of just a few readily available states.142 One has to worry that the
availability of states’ views may be self-selecting; perhaps states that vehemently
oppose the use of force are those whose practice is easily located, whereas
those who approve or are acquiescent leave little trace of their views.
To avoid some of these difficulties, international lawyers often rely on
decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly in condemning, or not
condemning, a particular use of force.143 Nevertheless, use of state practice for
treaty interpretation should focus on the states that are parties to the treaty, and
not on other states, organizations or persons. As such, it is arguable that
decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly or of a regional
organization, as to whether a state is acting consistently with Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, are not directly relevant or should be placed lower in the hierarchy
of relevant state practice. They might only be relevant if the state’s action had a
bearing upon the provisions of the U.N. Charter that is relevant to that U.N. organ
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or regional organization.144 These decisions might be used as surrogates for
providing information about what states themselves actually think, but they
should be recognized as indirect evidence of relevant state practice. And, again,
at their heart, the General Assembly and the Security Council are political, not
legal, organs; it is not always clear if they are expressing a view as to whether a
particular use of force is a violation of the U.N. Charter.
On the other hand, perhaps the Security Council’s decisions should, in
some sense, be granted special significance given the role of the Security
Council in maintaining international peace and security under the U.N. Charter.145
Perhaps when joining the Charter, states delegate to the Security Council the
right to express their views on what conduct falls within or outside the norms set
by the U.N. Charter, in which case we should downgrade the practice of states
who are not Members of the Security Council at the time of the use of force in
question.146 Yet, to the extent that the views of an organ such as the Security
Council are found to be particularly relevant, are only the resolutions actually
adopted by the organ relevant, or are the individual views of the Security Council
Members significant as well? If the views of the Security Council Members are
indeed relevant, should we grant even greater relevance to the Security Council’s
permanent members, which have been recognized as having a special status in
the maintenance of peace and security?147 Sorting through issues regarding the
way we assess global state practice is critical to closing the significant gaps
between the different schools of thought on preemptive self-defense.
E.

The Problem of Frequency of Practice

One central problem in analyzing state practice regarding preemptive selfdefense is that traditional state practice on this topic is quite sparse. For lawyers
opposed to preemptive self-defense, this lack of practice signals that preemptive
self-defense is disfavored.148 Yet scarcity of practice does not necessarily reflect
such a belief; it may just indicate that the circumstances calling for preemptive
self-defense only infrequently arise. At the same time, lawyers favoring a right of
preemptive self-defense may believe they have identified certain instances where
such action is condoned, but the infrequency of such practice makes it hard to
ascertain a clear emergent consensus on the matter.
Four avenues of addressing the infrequency problem may be fruitful for
analyses in this area. First, as indicated in the prior sections, each incident of
potential preemptive self-defense should be more carefully analyzed so as to
discern not just the circumstances of that incident, but also whether the incident
suggests certain trends and, if so, their nuances.149 It is not enough to recount
briefly the facts of an incident and a few reactions from some states; more robust
methodologies can, and should, be employed in determining what the incident
stands for and how it should be viewed in the context of other incidents. One
thoughtful approach may be seen in a genre of study advocated by Michael
Reisman.150 Perhaps through a higher quality of analysis of incidents of potential
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preemptive self-defense, the problem of quantity of incidents will be less severe.
Second, clarifying whether state practice is relevant in interpreting the
meaning of the Charter or, alternatively, in determining whether a new norm of
customary international law has emerged, may assist international lawyers when
considering the frequency of practice necessary to establish a new meaning or
norm. If resort to state practice is for the purpose of interpreting the Charter,
arguably there need not be a high level of frequency of conduct; rather, what is
needed is practice that “is consistent, and is common to, or accepted by, all the
parties.”151 Alternatively, if state practice is being used as a means of
establishing a new norm of customary international law, then there may be an
expectation of greater repetition and constancy of practice,152 possibly through
acts and not just words,153 particularly if it is deviating from a treaty to which
states are parties.
Third, lawyers should consider expanding the scope of the practice taken
into consideration when assessing the legality of preemptive self-defense
because it may provide a much richer base of data upon which to assess legal
expectations. Incidents of actual preemptive self-defense are obviously relevant,
but a careful analysis would also look for other forms of state practice. For
example, there may be relevant incidents where states decided that preemptive
self-defense could be undertaken or where they threatened preemptive selfdefense, even if ultimately such action was not taken. As discussed in President
Clinton’s recent memoirs, in 1993 the United States considered a preemptive
strike against North Korea to disable a potential nuclear weapons program, but
stepped back from doing so when North Korea entered into an accord with the
United States.154 Similarly, in February 2003, Japan asserted that it would
launch a preemptive military action against North Korea if Japan had firm
evidence North Korea was planning a missile attack.155
Lawyers might
systematically seek to uncover such decisions and warnings by states so as to
determine whether states capable of projecting force, when confronted with a
dangerous, albeit long-term, threat, view their obligations under the U.N. Charter
as permitting the use of force against that threat, even if force ultimately is not
deployed. Alternatively, such analysis might reveal insistent voices in opposition
to the deployment of such force, whose objections are galvanized by concerns
with violating global expectations as embodied in the U.N. Charter. Further,
relevant state practice might be found in the use of force beyond scenarios of
anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense. If state practice can be
found in other areas, such as humanitarian intervention or rescue of nationals,
indicating a departure from the apparent norm embedded in Article 51, then
perhaps all such practice considered collectively can provide better insight into
general contemporary norms on the use of force, which in turn would be helpful
in considering preemptive self-defense.
There may also be relevant state practice separate from incidents of the
use of force. Rather than trying to take “snapshots” of government attitudes in
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reaction to specific incidents, perhaps international lawyers should be seeking
information about the attitudes of government decision-makers on a day-to-day
basis, and perhaps with respect to matters of direct concern to them. For
example, suppose it were possible to obtain a memorandum from the legal office
of every foreign ministry of all 191 states that would directly answer the following
three questions:
1.

If your government was convinced that your country was in
danger of an imminent attack by a neighboring state, and
you had the means to act militarily in advance of that attack
to stop it, would doing so violate your obligations under the
U.N. Charter?

2.

If your government was convinced that your country was in
danger of an attack at some point in the next twelve months
by a neighboring state, and you had the means to act
militarily in advance of that attack to stop it, would doing so
violate your obligations under the U.N. Charter?

3.

Do you still regard the U.N. Charter as binding law with
respect to the use of force by Member States?

International lawyers might consider whether having those 191
memoranda would be much better evidence of the status of contemporary norms
on the use of force than focusing exclusively on actual incidents of anticipatory or
preemptive self-defense. Certainly, the answers given by a state in the context
of itself facing a threat of an attack seems more pertinent than the vote of that
state’s representative at the U.N. General Assembly, with respect to an incident
that occurred across the globe (a vote about which the permanent representative
may not even have instructions from her home government). If having such
memoranda would be highly probative, then perhaps international lawyers should
be thinking about how to go about getting them or something like them.
Other forms of practice might be considered as well, such as trends in the
development of new international agreements or the attitudes of states as
expressed through decisions by international organizations unrelated to specific
incidents. For example, there is an extensive web of international agreements on
WMD, ranging from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty156 to the Chemical
Weapons Convention157 to the Biological Weapons Convention158 to other related
instruments,159 all designed to help maintain international peace and security
among states. Although none of these instruments expressly authorizes states
on their own initiative to enforce compliance, and indeed contemplate alternative
methods for monitoring and exposing compliance, international lawyers might
consider whether the existence of such widely-adhered to agreements has
influenced for states the meaning to be placed on Article 51. Shortly after
adoption of the U.N. Charter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)
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asserted that violation of an IAEA convention might be of so grave a character as
to give rise to a right of self-defense under Article 51.160 The United States also
took this position.161 International lawyers might study whether such an attitude
can be found within various international organizations today concerned with
WMD, whether the use of military force by one or more of the major military
powers to ensure compliance with WMD obligations is acknowledged or at least
tacitly accepted by such organizations in their dealings with recalcitrant states, or
whether, in fact, such a possibility is routinely rejected as unlawful.
Similarly, there is an extensive web of international agreements directed
against specific types of terrorist acts, such as hijacking of aircraft,162 sabotage of
aircraft,163 taking of hostages,164 violent offenses onboard aircraft,165 crimes
against certain protected persons166 and--most recently--the suppression of
terrorist bombings167 and the financing of terrorism.168 Although none of these
instruments expressly authorizes states to use military force against another
state to prevent terrorist attacks, the conventions typically require states to
criminalize not just the commission of a terrorist act, but the intent to commit
such acts, as well as the facilitation and support given to such acts.169 At the
same time, states’ language with respect to terrorism has become increasingly
cast in terms of a “war” on terrorism and a need to “combat” terrorists. Thus, the
Security Council has repeatedly declared that “acts of international terrorism
constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in
the twenty-first century”170 and has called upon states “to work together urgently
to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation
and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to
terrorism.”171 Moreover, the Security Council has expressed its determination to
“combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts,” and in that context has recognized the inherent right of selfdefense.172 International lawyers might consider whether the existence of widelyadhered-to agreements outlawing terrorism and the increasingly strident
premium placed on adhering to such agreements to “combat” such a “threat” to
international peace has begun to influence the meaning to be placed on Article
51, the same way that the emergence of human rights treaties has led to
changing views on the permissibility of humanitarian intervention.173 A close
analysis of the conclusion of terrorist-related agreements and resolutions might
lead to a view that the attitudes of states are changing, or might alternatively
demonstrate that such attitudes are closely hewing to the belief that preemptive
self-defense is not within the scope of global expectations with respect to
permissible action.
Finally, international lawyers might do better at considering the relevance
of national laws relevant to the issue of preemptive self-defense. In international
law, principles of law operating among the national legal systems of states are
accepted as a source of international law, typically filling in the gaps and
uncertainties that necessarily exist in a decentralized interstate system. If one
were to survey civil law, common law, Islamic law, and the legal systems of
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Africa and Asia, an international lawyer might uncover useful information about
societal expectations on how the law should operate in situations involving the
use of force and self-defense by persons. Such laws might arise in the context of
transnational uses of force,174 in the context of the rules of engagement adopted
as a part of national military regulations and instructions or in the context of
permissible self-defense by persons under sophisticated national criminal
laws.175 If there is a consistent pattern of legal systems that accept “selfdefense” as inherently including actions in response to an immediate threat, then
such information would appear to be of some value in gauging contemporary
interpretations of Article 51.
Likewise, the inquiry might provide useful
information on whether self-defense may be preemptive in nature, such as
national criminal laws allowing a wife to slay an abusive, sleeping husband who
she thinks, at some point in the future, will in turn slay her. Of course, there are
reasons why the patterns discerned in global legal systems may not be
appropriate; with respect to national criminal laws, states are not persons, and
persons typically operate within national criminal law systems whereas states do
not. Nevertheless, by broadening their scope of inquiry to include general
principles of law, international lawyers might help close some of the gaps among
them.
F.

The Problem of Recent Versus Distant Practice

Assuming that the above problems can be addressed, international
lawyers might also consider whether more recent state practice should be given
greater emphasis than more distant practice. Whether that practice is in the form
of actual incidents involving the use of force or other evidence of the attitudes of
state decision-makers, presumably older practice is less relevant than newer
practice. International lawyers, however, rarely discuss state practice in such a
manner, and instead lump together incidents spanning decades. Yet, there
appear to be significant historical periods where global politics have dramatically
influenced the way states think about uses of force, whether it be the bipolar
confrontation of the Cold War, the “new world order” of the immediate post-Cold
War or the post-September 11 period in which we now find ourselves. Is
evidence of state practice across these different time periods all of equal weight?
Should the most distant be discarded as antiquated or should practice within any
particular period be discarded as aberrant?
For example, should any examples of anticipatory or preemptive selfdefense during the Cold War, when there was virtually no chance of the Security
Council authorizing states to use force, now be discarded because the Security
Council has demonstrated repeatedly since 1990 its willingness to authorize the
use of force, even if in some circumstances (e.g., the 2003 invasion of Iraq) it
does not? Or conversely, to the extent that it is relevant that the Israeli attack on
the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981 was widely condemned by states at the
time,176 would it also be relevant if it could be shown that by 1991, after weapons
inspectors entered Iraq and realized how much progress Iraq had made on the
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development of nuclear weapons, many states believed that, in hindsight, the
Israeli attack was a blessing?
G.

The Problem of Resort to the Travaux of the Charter

As noted above, treaty interpretation calls for recourse to the preparatory
work of the treaty (or travaux préparatoires) only when the initial interpretation
leads to an ambiguous or obscure meaning or to an absurd or unreasonable
result.177 In the context of construing Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the different
schools discussed above typically find their own interpretation as unambiguous,
but that of the other schools as absurd or unreasonable.178
As such,
international lawyers tend to resort to the negotiating history of the Charter
(principally the records of the San Francisco Conference in 1945) to bolster their
existing position.179 Strict constructionists find that the travaux préparatoires
preclude anticipatory self-defense and preemptive self-defense,180 but imminent
and qualitative threat theorists find the opposite.181
To the extent that international lawyers see the travaux préparatoires as
relevant,182 international lawyers might first confront the proposition--for which
there is some authority--that when interpreting the text of the constitution of an
international organization, the original intention of the drafters of the constitution
should not be emphasized, particularly because the parties may increase or
change, and because such a constitution, by its nature, should not be viewed as
static.183 If that proposition is correct, then we are better served by inquiring into
state practice today by the Members of the United Nations, then trying to fathom
original meanings.
On the other hand, if we are to explore original meanings, international
lawyers may wish to broaden their inquiry beyond the official documents tabled at
the San Francisco Conference, since by doing so they will find that the idea of
preemptive self-defense was known to those present at San Francisco, and that
the Charter was drafted so as to preclude such action.184 The impetus for Article
51 came from the U.S. delegation to the conference in response to certain
demands from the Latin American delegations.185 In the course of the U.S.
drafting of the article, U.K. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden apparently argued to
U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius (the head of the U.S. delegation) that
the right of self-defense under Article 51 should not be triggered only when there
was an “armed attack.”186 Eden reportedly indicated that the United Kingdom
might wish to act in self-defense against potential measures undertaken by the
USSR to expand its influence in Europe and the Mediterranean.187
Consequently, Eden wanted Article 51 to allow self-defense against measures
that fell short of direct aggression. Stettinius, however, refused to drop the
reference to “armed attack,” saying that a broader phraseology would allow
states too great a leeway, including the right to preventive actions, which could
destroy the viability of the United Nations.188 Indeed, Stettinius reportedly noted
that both World War I and World War II had begun with preventative attacks. In
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the face of Stettinius’ refusal, the United Kingdom backed down.189 To the extent
that resort is made to such history, international lawyers should consider whether
similar exchanges and attitudes could be found among the other delegations to
the San Francisco Conference.
V.

Conclusion

To the extent that the intervention in Iraq in 2003 is regarded as an act of
preemptive self-defense, the aftermath of that intervention may presage an era
where states resist resorting to large-scale preemptive self-defense. The
intervention in Iraq highlighted considerable policy difficulties with the resort to
preemptive self-defense: an inability to attract allies; the dangers of faulty
intelligence regarding a foreign state’s weapons programs and relations with
terrorist groups; the political, economic and human costs in pursuing wars of
choice; and the resistance of a local populace or radicalized factions to what is
viewed as an unwarranted foreign invasion and occupation. Preemptive selfdefense may continue to be used by powerful states, however, especially on a
smaller scale, such as missile attacks against weapons facilities or terrorist
camps in “rogue” states.
Resort to such force is “channeled and disciplined by the notions that
members of a society share about when force is legitimate and what kinds of
goals it can achieve.”190 In part, those notions are captured by the norms of
international law because, over time, war has become perceived not as an
honorable undertaking by states, but as a necessary evil, one to be avoided
except as a matter of last resort and one that is now circumscribed by legal and
multilateral frameworks.191 Policy-makers considering a resort to preemptive
self-defense want to know whether such force will be regarded as internationally
lawful as a means of predicting its costs and may avoid or at least shape the
action to minimize those costs.
Unfortunately, the views of international lawyers are fractured on whether
preemptive self-defense is lawful.192 Numerically, most international lawyers
appear to fall into the schools of thought that reject preemptive self-defense, but
the debate is robust and will no doubt continue.193 As it continues, this essay
urges international lawyers to focus more on the theory and methodology they
employ in reaching their conclusions.194 Too often, international lawyers are not
explaining the basic legal theory they are using for their analysis.195 To the
extent that state practice since 1945 is a part of that legal theory, international
lawyers usually do not articulate the methodology that they believe is appropriate
for assessing incidents of intervention, nor why that methodology is superior to
other methodologies, prior to embarking on such assessments.196 The discourse
among international lawyers is uneven, not joined, and at times breezy. The
notion of preemptive self-defense raises certain difficult issues of methodology,
several of which have been noted in this essay.197 Only by grappling squarely
with such issues of theory and methodology will international lawyers be able to
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achieve a greater level of convergence in their views, thereby providing policymakers with better guidance and laying the groundwork for more stable
international rules on the use of force.

T-30

ENDNOTES
1. See generally The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) (providing
account of events leading up to and including terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001).
2. See, e.g., Amy F. Woolf, Congressional Research Service, Nuclear
Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, CRS Issue Brief
(updated Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB98038.pdf
(explaining potential safety issues regarding nuclear weapons security and
storage in former Soviet Union).

3. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly
Pathogens, 52 Peaceworks 1, 15-18 (2003),
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks52.pdf (discussing potential sources
of biological agents used in manufacture of biological weapons).

4. See T.R. Reid, Japanese Police Arrest Key Cult Figure; Media Reports Say
25-Year-Old Planned Lethal Subway Gas Attack, Wash. Post, May 15, 1995, at
A13 (describing circumstances and facts surrounding Tokyo subway gas attack).

5. See Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America: On the Front Lines of
Homeland Security--An Inside Look at the Coming Surveillance State 8, 220
(2004) (noting vulnerabilities of United States); see also Stephen Flynn,
America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from
Terrorism 81-110 (2004) (discussing vulnerability of United States to terrorist
attack via shipping containers coming through American ports).

6. See, e.g., Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War
on Terror 152-58 (2004) (describing analysis by anonymous Central Intelligence
Agency official of al Qaeda’s determination to use WMD against United States);
see also Bill Miller & Christine Haughney, Nation Left Jittery by Latest Series of
Terror Warnings, Wash. Post, May 22, 2002, at A1 (reporting U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s statement that terrorists will inevitably obtain
WMD and U.S. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge’s statement that
additional terrorist attacks are “not a question of if, but a question of when”). Al
Qaeda has already carried out post-September 11 attacks in Bali, Casablanca,
F-2

Chechnya, Iraq, Istanbul, Madrid, Philippines, Riyadh and Thailand. See
Anonymous, supra, at 91-100 (listing numerous attacks carried out by Al Qaeda
around world since September 11 attacks).

7. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15
(2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter National Security
Strategy] (asserting that international law has recognized need for nations to
defend themselves against states that present imminent danger and that United
States maintains option of preemptive actions against serious dangers to national
security); see also Commencement Address at the United States Military
Academy in West Point, New York, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 944, 946
(June 10, 2002) (“[O]ur security will require all Americans to be forward-looking
and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our
liberty and to defend our lives.”); National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction 3 (2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (arguing
that in order for counter-terrorism measures to be effective, U.S. military forces
must have ability to preemptively attack WMD-armed adversaries, destroying
WMD before they can be used); Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Annual Report to the President and the Congress 30 (2002),
http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/index.htm (evaluating lessons that
should be learned by United States following events of September 11, 2001 and
military campaign in Afghanistan, including lesson that “defending the United
States requires prevention and sometimes preemption”); Richard N. Haass,
Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at Georgetown
University (Jan. 14, 2003), at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm
(asserting that United States must take preventative measures to prevent failure
of states and consequences that follow).

8. National Security Strategy, supra note 7, at 15.

9. Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1499 (2002); see Carl E. Behrens, Congressional
Research Service, Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues, CRS Issue Brief
(updated June 21, 2004), http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB10091.pdf (“If
nonproliferation and deterrence fail, the Defense Department could be ordered to
use military force to destroy weapons of mass destruction.”).

10. See Transcript: First Presidential Debate (Sept. 30, 2004),
F-3

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html
(debating issues of foreign policy). Asked for his “position on the whole concept
of preemptive war,” Senator John Kerry answered:
The president always has the right, and always has had the
right, for preemptive strike. That was a great doctrine throughout
the Cold War. And it was always one of the things we argued about
with respect to arms control.
No president, though [sic] all of American history, has ever ceded,
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to
protect the United States of America.
Id.
11. For a discussion of the repercussions of violating international law on
preemptive self-defense, see infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
12. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
13. See id. at 103.
14. For a discussion of the different views of the legality of preemptive selfdefense, see infra notes 18-70 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of methodological problems in assessing state practice, see
infra notes 71-192 and accompanying text.
16. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has only occasionally received
cases concerning transnational use of force, although currently the ICJ has
before it a case arising from an alleged invasion of the Democratic Republic of
Congo by Uganda in 1998. See International Court of Justice: Current Docket of
the Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket.htm (showing list of cases
currently awaiting adjudication before ICJ) (last accessed March 15, 2005).

17. For a detailed discussion of the United States and the difficult problems that
arise in its adherence to international norms on the use of force, see John F.
Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs 14271 (2004) (discussing historical examples of American use of force and relating
those examples to problems under international law); see also John E. Noyes,
American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, and General International Law, 19
Conn. J. Int’l L. 293 (2004) (arguing that international law “has some purchase

F-4

on top U.S. officials”).
18. For a discussion of the four different schools of thought regarding preemptive
self-defense, see infra notes 19-70 and accompanying text.
19. For example, Thomas Franck at one time lamented the apparent death of
Article 2(4), thus placing him in the “Charter-is-dead” school. See generally
Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. 809 (1970) (discussing demise of
Article 2(4)). For a discussion of the “Charter-is-dead” school, see infra notes 6970 and accompanying text. After the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, Franck
asserted that Article 2(4) “has died again,” but then deployed arguments
suggesting that he really falls into the “imminent threat” school and rejects the
reasoning of the “qualitative threat” school. See Thomas M. Franck, What
Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 607, 610, 619
(2003) [hereinafter What Happens Now?] (asserting that doctrine preemptive
self-defense as articulated by Bush Administration “would stand the Charter on
its head”). For a discussion of the “imminent threat” and the “qualitative threat”
schools, see infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.

20. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, 59 Stat. 1031, 1037, T.S. No. 993
[hereinafter U.N. Charter] (providing that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”).

21. See International Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War, August 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (providing that “The High
Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another”).

22. There are other norms of international law prohibiting uses of force such as
norms embedded in regional charters. See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of
African Unity, done May 25, 1963, preamble, arts. II-III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39,
available at http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm (asserting that key
principle of African Union was respect for sovereignty of each state and noninterference in their affairs) (The OAU Charter was recently superseded by
F-5

Charter of the African Union). In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ identified
additional, related norms under customary international law in the form of a
prohibition on the violation of a state’s sovereignty and a prohibition on
intervention in the affairs of another state. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106-09, 111, 212 (June
27) (discussing non-intervention principle in customary international law including
prohibition on violation of state’s sovereignty and prohibition on intervention in
affairs of another state); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force
by States 26-49 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (looking at justifications for historical
examples of nations resorting to war and examining customary reasons for using
force under international law); Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law
§ 290 (A.C. Boyd, ed., Stevens and Sons 1889) (describing circumstances under
which it is acceptable for states to resort to force for redress, including
embargoes and taking forcible possession of “things in controversy”).

23. See Brownlie, supra note 22, at 265-68 (arguing that Article 2(4) cannot be
given meaning that allows nation to use force so long as nation simply states that
it has no intention of infringing on other state’s territorial integrity; provision must
be read more broadly than that); 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary 123-24 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1994)
(arguing that any interpretation of Article 2(4) that permits states to use force is
incompatible with purpose of provision and is therefore untenable); La Charte
des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par Article 125 (J. Cot & A. Pellet
eds., 2d ed. 1991); Leland Goodrich & Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United
Nations: Commentary and Documents 44-45 (World Peace Foundation, 3d ed.
1969) (asserting that Article 2(4) was designed to prevent armed conflict, leaving
very few exceptions to that goal); Oscar Schachter, International Law in
Theory and Practice 112-13 (1991) (discussing interpretations of Article 2(4)
and noting that its words qualify as all-inclusive prohibition against force but that
extent of this prohibition is not clear from textual analysis alone); C. Humphrey
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 493 (1952-II).

24. See generally Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United
Nations Security Council 133-49 (2004) (discussing power of Security Council
under Chapter VII and “the threshold that triggers Chapter VII action”); see also
U.N. Charter, supra note 19, art. 39-51, 59 Stat. at 1043-45, T.S. No. 993
(setting forth U.N. procedures for handling threats to peace, breaches of peace,
and acts of aggression, including Security Council authorization of use of force
against states that aggressively threaten peace).

F-6

25. U.N. Charter, supra note 19, art. 51, 59 Stat. at 1044-45, T.S. No. 993. In its
entirety, the article reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
26. For a detailed presentation of strict constructionist views, see infra notes 2736 and accompanying text.
27. Brownlie, supra note 22, at 278; see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 797-98 (Stevens &
Sons 1950) (arguing that Article 51’s allowance of use of force in self-defense
applies only when nation faces actual armed attack, and therefore, no “imminent”
threat of attack can justify armed aggression under Article 51); Lassa
Oppenheim, International Law vol.2, 156 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., Longmans,
Green and Co., 7th ed., 1952) (noting that U.N. Charter “confines the right of
armed self-defence to the case of an armed attack as distinguished from
anticipated attack or from various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of
armed attack”); Hans Wehberg, L’Interdiction du Recours á la Force: Le Principe
et les Problèmes qui se Posent, 78 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 81 (1951) (finding that selfdefense under Article 51 is impermissible “en cas de simple menace
d’agression”).

28. Philip Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 166 (Archon Books 1968).

29. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions 156
(1990).

30. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 167 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 3d ed. 2001); see 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
supra note 22, at 676 (“An anticipatory right of self-defence would be contrary to
F-7

the wording of Art. 51 (‘if an armed attack occurs’) . . . .”); id. n.138 (citing
authorities disfavoring anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense);
Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 63 (2004)
(“[I]f there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence
to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize
such action if it chooses to.”). At the same time, Dinstein would allow for selfdefense in a situation where an attacker “has committed itself to an armed attack
in an ostensibly irrevocable way” even if the attacker has not crossed the frontier,
although he is unclear how one would judge that such an attack is irrevocably
underway. See Dinstein, supra, at 172 (arguing for legitimacy of “interceptive”
self-defense under Art. 51 with belief that it would be preposterous to force nation
to endure potentially crippling first strike simply to preserve their absolute right to
self defense).

31. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27) (“[I]t will be necessary to distinguish the most
grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other
less grave forms.”); see also Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 187-88 (Nov. 6) (ruling that in order for nation to attack
another nation, it must show that there was armed attack for which other nation is
responsible). As noted previously, the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua said that it was not expressing a view with respect to
the right to defend against an imminent attack. For a discussion of Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text. The ICJ, however, confirmed that states do not have a right
of individual or collective armed response to acts that do not constitute an “armed
attack.” See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986
I.C.J. at 103, 110 (noting that for one state to legally use force against another
because of other’s own act, that act in question must be an armed attack). In
doing so, the ICJ did not provide a complete definition of what constituted an
“armed attack.” On the one hand, the ICJ implied that a “mere frontier incident”
does not constitute an “armed attack” and stated that providing assistance to
rebels in the target state in the form of weapons or logistical or other support did
not constitute an “armed attack.” See id. at 103-04. On the other hand, the ICJ
considered an “armed attack” as occurring when regular armed forces cross an
international border, or when a state sends armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries that carry out acts of armed force against another state of sufficient
gravity so as to equate with an actual armed attack by regular forces. See id. at
103 (describing actions by state that would constitute armed attack according to
ICJ); see also 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra
note 22, at 670 (noting that “armed attacks” must be “military actions [that] are on
a certain scale and have a major effect, and are thus not to be considered mere
frontier incidents”); Dinstein, supra note 30, at 173-74 (“There is no doubt that,
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for an illegal use of force to acquire the dimensions of an armed attack, a minimal
threshold has to be reached . . . . In the absence of an armed attack, selfdefense is not an option available to the victim State . . . .”).
32. For a discussion of the meaning of “armed attack,” see supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 544, 545 (1971) (looking to Korean War,
President Kennedy’s response to Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and War in
Vietnam as examples of state action after ratification of United Nations Charter).

34. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 141 (2d ed.,
1979) [hereinafter How Nations Behave]; see Antonio Cassese, International
Law 309 (001) [hereinafter Cassese, International Law] (“If one undertakes a
perusal of State practice . . . it becomes apparent that such practice does not
evince agreement among States regarding the interpretation or the application of
Article 51 with regard to anticipatory self-defence.”); Henkin, supra note 29, at
156 (“The permissive interpretation of Article 51 has found little favour with
Governments.”). But see Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided
World 230-36 (Clarendon Press 1986) (arguing that consensus is growing for
allowing anticipatory self-defense).

35. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 115 (Malcolm
Evans & Phoebe Okowa, eds., 2000). By 2004, Gray was less certain about this
“trend,” and modified her treatise to speak of a clear trend before the terrorist
attacks of September 11. See Christine Gray, International Law and the Use
of Force 133 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Gray 2d ed.] (“The clear trend in state
practice before 9/11 was to try to bring the action within Article 51 and to claim
the existence of an armed attack rather than to argue expressly for a wider right
under customary international law.”).

36. Cassese, International Law, supra note 34, at 310-11.

37. For a listing of authorities falling into this school, see 1 The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 22, at 666 n.28.
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38. See D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 187 (Manchester
Univ. Press 1959) (stating reference to “inherent right” in Article 51 indicates “an
existing right, independent of the Charter and not the subject of an express
grant”).
39. For a pre-1945, and thus pre-U.N. Charter, example of defense against an
imminent threat, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
40. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2
John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law 412 (1906). The incident
involved an assertion by the United Kingdom that its attack in U.S. territory on the
schooner Caroline was permissible self-defense because the schooner had
previously been used (and might be used again) to ferry supplies across the
border to Canada to rebels who were fighting U.K. rule in Canada. See Moore,
supra, at 409-412; see also Daniel Webster, The Works of Daniel Webster
292-303. Webster rejected the U.K. assertion, observing that at the time of the
attack, the Caroline was not engaged in or being prepared for such transport. In
support of his views, Webster cited to eminent scholars of international law,
including Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel. For a view that anticipatory self-defense
did not exist even under pre-Charter customary international law, see Roberto
Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] II (1) Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n. 13, at 65-67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/333.
41. See, e.g., Bowett, supra note 38, at 188-89 (1959) (arguing that Article 51
definitely allows right to self-defense and that this right has always presumed to
be anticipatory); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force:
International Law After Iraq, 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 785, 792 (2004) (asserting
that Article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense, as matter of customary law, so
long as it is proportionate response to threat).
42. See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 41, at 792 (claiming that even though
Article 51 specifically refers to armed attack, there is no impairment of right of
anticipatory self-defense when attack is imminent).
43. See J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 419 (H. Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963)
(analyzing other interpretations of French text and finding room for uncertainty in
interpretation).
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44. For a further discussion of the inherent right to self-defense as included in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, see supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
45. How Nations Behave, supra note 34, at 143-44; see Julius Stone,
Aggression and World Order 99 (1958). The author posits:
Suppose military intelligence at the Pentagon
received indisputable evidence that a hostile State
was poised to launch intercontinental ballistic
missiles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead,
against New York, Boston and Washington, would it
be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait
until those cities had received the missiles before it
reacted by the use of force?
Id.

46. For a discussion of these incidents, see Christopher Greenwood,
International Law and the United States' Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. Va.
L. Rev. 933 (1986) (discussing situation surrounding air attack, domestic and
world reaction to air strike, claim by United States that act was justified under
article 51 of United Nations Charter and other justifications for attack); William V.
O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30
Va. J. Int'l L. 421, 464-65 (1990) (summarizing position of United States and its
allies versus position of many Third World and Communist States).
47. For a further discussion of these attacks and the international legal issues
implicated by them, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of the views of one adherent to the imminent threat school
regarding the acceptability of the use of force in the face of an imminent armed
attack, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats
and Armed Attacks 107 (2002) [hereinafter Recourse to Force]; What
Happens Now?, supra note 19, at 619 (“The principle of anticipatory self-defense
has been known to international law for almost two centuries and has gained a
certain credibility, despite the restrictive terms of Charter Article 51. This
credibility is augmented both by contemporary state practice and by deduction
from the logic of modern weaponry.”).
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50. See What Happens Now?, supra note 19, at 619 (finding Bush
Administration’s doctrine of preemptive self-defense to be expanding
exponentially range of permissible action); Georg Nolte, Preventive Use of Force
and Preventive Killings: Moves into a Different Legal Order, 5 Theoretical
Inquiries in L. 111 (2004). (arguing that Bush doctrine and Israeli policy of
“targeted killing” risk transforming indispensable foundations of international law
on use of force and human rights).

51. See Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 Eur.
J. Int’l. L. 227, 238 (2003) (asserting that creating a rule that did not provide a
“workable definition of permissible force might end the abolition of the prohibition
of the use of force altogether”); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 74-75
(2000) (analyzing the Webster formulation as supporting only action against an
imminent threat).

52. The failure of the U.S. intelligence community to assess accurately Iraq’s
WMD capability is described in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq (July 7, 2004), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf. (analyzing pre-war intelligence
regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and Iraq’s connection to
terrorism). For a discussion of how intelligence can be manipulated, see
generally James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of
America’s Intelligence Agencies (2004).

53. The ICJ has stated:
The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary
international law. As the Court stated in the case concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States): “There is a specific rule whereby selfdefence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the
armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established
in customary international law.” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para.
176). This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the
Charter, whatever the means of force employed.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 245 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion; see
F-12

Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 18788 (Nov. 6) (“The United States must also show that its actions were necessary
and proportional to the armed attack made on it.”). Discussions of necessity and
proportionality also often refer to the Caroline incident since Secretary of State
Daniel Webster analyzed those elements as cornerstones of the legal doctrine of
self-defense. See 29 British & Foreign State Papers 1129, 1138 (1937).
54. See, e.g., Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 121 (noting that necessity and
proportionality are both required aspects of actions taken in self-defense and that
such action is necessary and proportionate only if it is taken to repel or stop
attack, and not for punitive or retaliatory measures). There is a link between the
customary rules on necessity and proportionality between the jus ad bellum and
the jus in bello. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship
Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 Rev. Int’l Stud. 221 (1983). Thus,
the Lieber Code’s definition of necessity states: “Military necessity, as
understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” Francis Lieber,
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, in
Dietrich Schindler & Jirí Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection
of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents 3, at 6 (3d ed. 1988).

55. See, e.g., Concerning Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198-99 (“In this
connection, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the United States
complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, . . . which does not
suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen as a necessary act.”).

56. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
Am. J. Int’l L. 391, 391 (1993). The author states:
The resort to force . . . is limited by the customary law
requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful
aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of
armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based
on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not
enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage
on the enemy.
Id. Thus, in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ decided that even if Iran had laid a
mine that severely damaged a U.S. warship, responding to that mining with a
military operation that destroyed two Iranian frigates and a number of other
Iranian naval vessels and aircraft, could not be regarded as proportionate self-
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defense. See Concerning Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 198-99 (“As a response to
the mining, . . . of a single United States warship . . . neither “Operation Praying
Mantis” as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the [platforms], can be
regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in
self defence.”).
57. For a further discussion of the beliefs and arguments of the imminent threat
school, see supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
58. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 19-20, Aug.
2002, (ASIL Task Force on Terrorism), available at http:
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. (pointing out that only by taking over
another country wholly and eliminating its government can one country be sure
that another will not attack).

59. See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum
World Public Order 217 (1961) (examining requirements of self-defense:
necessity and proportionality). Abraham Sofaer argues that the Caroline
standard of responding against a threat that is “‘instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means’” should be limited only to situations where “the state
from which attacks are anticipated is not responsible for the threat, and is both
able and willing to suppress them.” Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Preemption, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 209, 219-220 (2003). In all other situations, Sofaer
believes that anticipatory or preemptive self-defense is simply governed by the
principles of necessity and proportionality. See id. at 320 (noting that “[T]he
standard generally applicable to pre-emptive self-defence is, rather, the same
general rule applicable to all uses of force: necessity . . . together with the
requirement that any action be proportionate to the threat addressed.”).

60. In 1962 President Kennedy stated:
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons
represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute
maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic
missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of
their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be
regarded as a definite threat to peace.
President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People
on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 485 Pub. Papers 806, 807 (Oct. 22, 1962).
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61. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 59, at 220 (finding necessity to act and
proportionality to be proper standard, with several factors determining necessity,
including: nature and magnitude of threat, likelihood threat will be realized,
availability and exhaustion of other alternatives and whether use of force is
consistent with UN Charter and other international law); John Yoo, International
Law and the War in Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 572, 574 (2003) (examining
Caroline test in light of weapons of mass destruction and finding that current test
has become significantly more nuanced than Webster’s Caroline definition).

62. Most international lawyers do not focus on the magnitude of harm to the
victim, but in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 53, at 262-63,
266, the ICJ accepted that fundamental rules of international law change “in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would
be at stake.” See id. at 262-63.

63. See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Law of War, 97
Am. J. Int’l L. 82 passim (2003) (suggesting that such doctrine may contribute to
world public order if subjected to appropriate criteria).

64. For background on the invasion of Panama, see Jennifer Miller, International
Intervention: The United States Invasion of Panama, 31 Harv. Int’l L.J. 633
(1990).

65. For background on the 1993 attack on Iraq, see Alan D. Surchin, Terror and
the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 457 (1995).

66. For background on the attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan, see Jules Lobel,
The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and
Afghanistan, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 537 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559 (1999).

67. See, e.g., Kim R. Holmes, U.S. Dep’t of State Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, The Future of U.S.-UN Relations, Remarks at
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the XXI German American Conference (June 13, 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/21913/htm. The speaker remarked:
As contentious as the disagreement over Iraq was, it should not be
over-emphasized. Neither the United States nor the U.K. ever
asserted a right to operate outside their obligations under
international law. Neither took a position that called into question
the existing international legal regime related to the use of force.
Each country had lawyers examine relevant [U.N. Security Council]
resolutions and clarify the legal basis for use of force before the
decision to proceed was made.
Id.
68. Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory SelfDefense, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 28, 2002, 24, 27 [hereinafter Preempting
Terrorism]; see also Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of
Power: Interventionism After Kosovo (2001) [hereinafter Limits of Law]
(examining humanities effort to subject use of force to rule of law and finding that
it is no longer possible to know when use of force by state is legal under
international law. Currently states intervene on basis of less concrete concepts
such as “justice”, or simply when it serves perceived interests of state); Michael
J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 539, 540 (2002)
(noting that use of force rules in United Nations Charter have been routinely
disregarded and that use of force rules are basically illusory). Professor Glennon
is not alone, especially if one looks outside the realm of international lawyers to
that of international relations theorists. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend,
International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 Stan. J.
Int’l L. 1, 28 (1990). One theorist stated:
Based on what states have been saying and what
they have been doing, there simply does not seem to
be a legal prohibition on the use of force against the
political independence and territorial integrity of states
as provided in even a modified version of Article 2(4).
The rule-creating process—-authoritative state
practice—-has rejected that norm.
Id.; see also Christine Chinkin, The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan
or Iconoclast, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 31, (2000) (questioning indispensability of UN
after Kosovo and finding UN’s role as icon of universal collective responsibility
may no longer functionally exist); John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the
Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15
Pace Int’l L. Rev. 283, 327 (2003) (finding that “Article 51's constraint on use of
force has collapsed in actual practice.”).
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69. See John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity 94 (1998) (explaining
that narrative explanatory protocol comprises two “orders” of information:
descriptive and configurative); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang
Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructive Challenge, 52 Int’l Org.
855-85 (1998) (discussing how modern theorizing in international relations views
world in terms of actors and interests, ignoring “class of facts that do not exist in
the physical object world . . . [facts that] depend on human agreement that they
exist and typically require human institutions for their existence. Social facts
include money, property rights . . . [and] marriage . . . .”).
70. For a further discussion of the key issues that arise in assessing
methodology and state practice on this topic, see infra notes 72-191 and
accompanying text.
71. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT] (providing
general rule of interpretation of treaties, including that treaties should be
interpreted in good faith, context for interpretation of treaty and other
considerations that should be taken into account). The VCLT’s authoritative
character as law, even for states not party to it, derives from the fact that it is now
generally accepted that most of its provisions are declaratory of the customary
international law of treaties. See 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that Vienna
Convention on law of treaties was registered “ex officio” on January 27, 1980).
Although the United States has not become a party to the VCLT, it regards the
substantive provisions of the VCLT as reflective of customary international law on
the subject. See S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971) (“The
convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current
treaty law and practice.”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States pt. III, introductory note (1987) (finding that Department of
State has stated that it regards particular articles of Vienna Convention as
codifying international law, and noting that United States courts have treated
various provisions of Convention as authoritative).

72. VCLT, supra note 71, art. 31(3)(b).

73. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 185 (2000).
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74. For a further discussion of the beliefs and theories of the strict constructionist
school, see supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
75. See 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 18,
at 493-98.

76. See id. at 439.

77. G.A. Res. 377(V), G.A.O.R., 5th Sess., 302nd Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/PV.302, 341 at 347 (Nov. 3, 1950). The resolution, entitled “Uniting for Peace”
in essence purports to transfer from the Security Council to the General
Assembly the authority to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII, in cases
where the Security Council is deadlocked. See id.
78. For a further discussion of the beliefs and views held by the strict
constructionist school, see supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
79. Treaty interpretation calls for recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty
(that is, the negotiating record) only where the initial interpretation leads to an
ambiguous or obscure meaning or to an absurd or unreasonable result. See
VCLT, supra note 56, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (presenting procedure for
treaty interpretation).
80. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and SelfDefense, 53 Am. J. Int’l. L. 597, 598-600 (1963) (referring to Caroline incident to
show that necessity of self-defense does not require an actual armed attack);
Bowett, supra note 38, at 187-190 (stating that Article 51 was intended to
safeguard right of self-defence, and not restrict it and referring to Caroline as
classical illustration of anticipatory self defense). While McDougal does not use
the term “inherent right”, he repeatedly refers to the understanding that acting in
self-defense does not require an actual armed attack as the “customary right” of
self-defense. See id.; see also D.W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of
Intervention and Self-Defense, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 38,
38-40 (John Norton Moore, ed. 1974) (arguing that Article 51 was intended to
preserve “traditional right” of self defense, which included right to take action
against threat before actual armed attack occurred). For further discussion, see
supra notes 37-58.
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82. See Sofaer, supra note 59, at 213 (presenting some scholars’ belief that
‘push button’ approach to analyzing Charter is flawed).
83. See id. at 212) (stating that current standard is “necessity” and this should be
determined in light of purposes of UN Charter).
84. See id. at 213-14 (concluding that qualitative threat school believes that
preemptive self-defense is only reasonable way to protect states from terrorism).

85. 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 22, at
803.
86. For a discussion of the Charter is dead view that norms have no meaning,
see supra note 68.
87. See How Nations Behave, supra note 34, at 146 (recognizing that norm lies
against use of force by states); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of
Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force 7-8 (2003) (“It is
precisely because states show restraint that we live in a world of sovereign states
at all.”).

88. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2002:
Uniform Crime Reports 19, 45 (2003) (presenting national crime statistics).

89. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force,
53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 130-31 (1986) (arguing that violation of laws does not
mean that legal restraints on conduct do not exist).

90. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules:
International Relations and Customary International Law 6 (1999) (noting
that use of quick, unorganized force to achieve goals has many disadvantages,
however, organized use of force backed by legal system is more efficient and
safer for states to employ).
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91. See Limits of Law, supra note 68, at 42 (“There is simply no reason to
assume that state conduct necessarily is caused by perceptions as to what a
treaty permits or prohibits. States act for reasons altogether unrelated to their
treaty obligations.”).

92. See generally Finnemore, supra note 88 (discussing various justifications for
military intervention). Professor Finnemore analyzes rules on the use of force
from a sociological perspective, meaning a perspective that explains the conduct
of actors by reference to the social structures in which they are embedded. See
id. (analyzing need and reasons for intervention based on surrounding social and
political circumstances). Among other things, she finds that legal norms have
played a key role in fundamentally changing state practice regarding the use of
force. See id. (noting that legal norms play important role in nations’
determinations regarding intervention).

93. For example, in the course of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair apparently saw considerable importance in obtaining
Security Council authorization, to the point that his government was considered
at risk of falling in March 2003 when it became clear that express Security
Council authorization was not forthcoming. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung & Colum
Lynch, Britain Races To Rework Resolution, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 2003, at A1
(reporting that Blair supported amending resolution even in face of challenge to
power); Glenn Frankel, Parliament Backs Blair on Action Against Baghdad,
Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 2003, at A17 (reporting on revolt, that ultimately was
defeated, in Blair’s Labor Party).

94. Jus cogens refers to a fundamental or peremptory norm of international law
from which states cannot deviate. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01, (June 27) (finding that
rule against use of force is “conspicuous example of a rule of international law
having the character of jus cogens”); see also VCLT, supra note 56, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S., at 344 (stating that norm of jus cogens “is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted . . . .”).

95. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
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States § 102 cmt. k (1987) (stating that provisions of U.N. Charter prohibiting use
of force have character of jus cogens as recognized by international community).

96. See Limits of Law, supra note 54, at 40-42 (asking why majority of states
cannot simply act to change rule that was previously accepted by international
community).
97. For a discussion of the interest in state practice, see supra notes 33-35, 48,
64-66, 69, and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the problem of examining what states say versus
examining what states do, see infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the issues surrounding identifying what states actually do, see
infra notes 124-142 and accompanying text. For a discussion on how to
incorporate the global reaction to a states use of force, see infra notes 143-149
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems of the relative
infrequency of state actions and possible solutions, see infra notes 150-177 and
accompanying text. For a discussion on the importance of recent versus
historical state practice, particularly in light of the events of September 11th, see
infra note 178 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems
associated with resorting to the Travaux (preparatory work) of the Charter, see
infra notes 179-191 and accompanying text.
99. See Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 102-03.
100. See, e.g., Cassese, International Law, supra note 34, at 308-310
(discussing rationale and conflicting views on anticipatory defense).
101. Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 130; see also Brunnée & Toope, supra note
32, at 790-91 (“For the purposes of assessing the fit of an action within a
normative framework, however, one must focus upon justifications actually
offered rather than suspected motivations.”).

102. See Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 130-31 (stating that “the point of
importance is that Israel did not rely on anticipatory self-defence to justify its
actions”).

103. States have not always submitted a report to the Security Council when they
have used force against other states. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in
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and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 121 (June 27). The
United States’ failure to report to the Security Council in this manner during the
actions at issue in the Nicaragua case, however, led the ICJ to observe “that this
conduct of the United States hardly conforms with the latter’s avowed conviction
that it was acting in the context of collective self-defence as consecrated by
Article 51 of the Charter,” and thus contributed to the ICJ’s finding that the United
States was not acting in self-defense. See id. Consequently, since that time the
United States typically has submitted such reports to the Security Council when
undertaking a use of force. See Gray 2d ed., supra note 35 at 102-103
(discussing how after Nicaragua case states regularly report actions to Security
Counsel, and in fact now tend to over-report claims and noting that United States
chose to report and thus justify each episode of use of force against Iran during
period of conflict between Iraq and Iran).

104. For trenchant criticisms in this regard, see Glennon, Limits of Law, supra
note 69, at 44-46, 56-58, 76-78, & 80.

105. See Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 102-03 (finding that Security
Counsel gave credence to argument to anticipatory self-defense by not censuring
Israeli action in any of its resolutions on issue); see Cassese, International Law,
supra note 34, at 308 (“Israel has resorted to anticipatory self-defence on various
occasions: for example in 1967 against Egypt . . . .”).

106. See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the “Jurisprudes,” 97 Am.
J. Int’l L. 585, 587-88 (2003) (discussing idea that because United Stated did not
justify Cuban quarantine on grounds of preemptive self-defense, it cannot be
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international law, as opposed to an interpretation of a treaty based on
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123. Some observers think that the driving motivation of influential persons in the
Bush Administration was not to deal with an urgent and imminent danger to the
United States but, rather, to establish a democracy in Iraq that would help in
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133. See id. (discussing support for theory that United States had been attacked
in September 2001, thus justifying its response in self-defense).

134. See Preempting Terrorism, supra note 69, at 26 (discussing argument that
United States’ military action in Afghanistan in 2001 was not prompted by armed
attack and was, instead, preemptive strike).

135. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World
War II 329, 331 (Cambridge University Press 1994) (discussing growth of United
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174. See, e.g., Joint Resolution Authorizing Force Against Iraq, supra note 9, at
1500 (stating that President has Constitutional authority to prevent and deter acts
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Wyoming L. Rev. 663 (2003) (discussing drafting history of Charter to determine
whether drafters intended to permit state to use preventive or preemptive force in
self defense).

F-34
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préparatoires).
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